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COMMENTS
ISRAEL REJECTS ITS OWN OFFSPRING: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
I.

INTRODUcTION

In an attempt to protect civilians from the dangers of armed
conflict, various international bodies have attempted to codify
harmful actions against innocent civilians into violations of
international law. 1 While people in one state often commit crimes
against people in another state, nation-states have had numerous
difficulties in prosecuting those responsible for trans-border crimes
before national criminal courts. On July 17, 1998, one hundred
and twenty countries voted to adopt a multilateral treaty
establishing the world's first permanent international criminal
court to try individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.2 The International Criminal Court
(ICC) adheres to the notion that individual government officials,
and not just the states they govern, could be responsible, under
1. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3548, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV]. The following four conventions were adopted at Geneva on
August 12, 1949 and entered into force on October 21, 1950: Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. Two additional protocols
were adopted subsequently: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12,
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol
I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional II to the
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflict (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter
Protocol II].
2. See David Stoelting, Rome Treaty Marks Historic Moment in International
Criminal Law, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 28, 1998, at 1. Seven countries voted against establishing
the ICC and twenty-one countries abstained. Israel, together with the United States, was
among the seven states that voted against the statute. See id.
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international law, for certain gross abuses. 3 The United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court 4 adopted the International
Criminal Court Statute (ICC Statute) 5 as the ICC's governing
document. 6 In accordance with Article 126, the ICC Statute, also
known as the Rome Treaty, enters into force only after sixty states
ratify the Treaty. 7 Although to date, eighty-four states signed the
ICC Statute, only four have officially ratified it; 8 thus, the Statute
has not yet taken effect.
Israel was one of the most fervent supporters of the ICC's
creation.9 Its support was undoubtedly influenced by the atrocities
the Nazis committed during World War II.
Although the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was created to
prosecute Nazi war criminals, 10 Israel continued to pursue the
establishment of a permanent criminal court to ensure that justice
is brought against criminals who commit such heinous crimes. 11
3. See Panel Discussion, Association of American Law Schools Panel on the
InternationalCriminal Court,36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1999).
4. The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly adopted a resolution determining
that a diplomatic conference to adopt a convention on the establishment of an
international criminal court would be held in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998. See
G.A. Res. 52/160, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 150, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/160 (1998).
5. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). The ICC Draft Statute, the
official name of which is the Rome Treaty, enumerates the violations to be tried before
the ICC and describes the Court's power.
6. See id.
7. See id. art. 126, at 1068.
8. See Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court: Ratification Status, art. 126
(visited Oct. 18, 1999) <www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm> [hereinafter Ratification
Status].
9. See Statement by Alan Baker (Delegation of Israel) to the International Criminal
Court, 53d G.A., 6th Comm., Agenda Item 153 (Oct. 22, 1998), in ISRAEL COMMUNIQUt,
Oct. 22, 1998 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law
Review) [hereinafter Statement by Alan Baker].
10. See AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR
WAR

CRIMINALS

OF THE

EUROPEAN

AxIs

POWERS

AND

CHARTER

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280
(entered into force Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter NUREMBERG CHARTER]. See also Daniel J.
Brown, Note, The InternationalCriminal Court and Trial in Absentia, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 763, 766 (1999).
11. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 9th Plenary mtg., July 17, 1998,
availableat (last visited Aug. 27, 1999) <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il> (Statement by Judge
Eli Nathan, Head of the Delegation of Israel) [hereinafter Statement by Judge Eli
Nathan].

1999]

Israeland the InternationalCriminal Court

209

Despite many laborious years of trying to create this permanent
entity, when the ICC was finally conceived, Israel had no choice
12
but to reject its own offspring.
Israel's main objection to the ICC Statute is that Israel's
settlement activity in the occupied territories has clearly been
targeted as a prosecutable war crime. 1 3 The assertion that Israeli
settlement activity constitutes a war crime fails to consider the
context in which these settlements have been established. The
Israeli Government also objects to the scope of the ICC's
jurisdiction. 14 While the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction includes
such core crimes as genocide, 15 serious violations of title laws and
customs applicable in armed conflict (war crimes), 16 and crimes
18
against humanity, 17 the Statute is both too broad and too narrow.
The Statute is too narrow because it fails to include several serious
crimes, such as airplane hijacking and biological and chemical
warfare. 1 9 It is too broad because the Statute expands the scope of
preexisting international law to include specific acts as war crimes
that have not before been recognized as such. 20 The Statute
redefines "transfer of population" and includes the indirect
transfer of a state's "own civilian population into the territory it
occupies" within its definition of war crimes. 2 1 Under this
provision, individuals living in Israeli settlements in the occupied
territories 22 could be charged with a war crime offense. 2 3 The
12. See Statement by Alan Baker, supra note 9.
13. See Palestinian Leaders Hail U.N. "Rejection" of Israeli Settlements, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (Paris), July 25, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, All News
Group File [hereinafter Palestinian Leaders]. See also Moshe Zak, Geneva Versus
Jerusalem, JERUSALEM POST, July 16, 1999, at 08A. The ICC Statute, Article 8,
paragraph 2(b), defines a crime as "[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying
Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the
deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or
outside this territory." Rome Treaty art. 8(2)(b), supra note 5, at 1006-1007 (emphasis
added).
14. See Statement by Alan Baker, supra note 9.
15. See Rome Treaty arts. 5-6, supra note 5, at 1003-1004.
16. See id. arts. 5, 8, at 1003-1004, 1006-1009.
17. See id. arts. 5, 7, at 1003-1005. See also Karen Berg, A Permanent International
Criminal Court,34 U.N. CHRON. 30, 32 (1997).
18. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 233.
19. See generally id.
20. See id.
21. See Rome Treaty art. 8 (2)(b)(viii), supra note 5, at 1007.
22. The term "occupied territories" refers to the territories Israel captured during the
1967 Six-Day War, including the areas commonly known as the West Bank and Gaza. See
Ahmad H. Tabari, Humanitarian Law: Deportation of Palestiniansfrom the West Bank
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Israeli territories, however, do not constitute "the most serious
crimes of international concern,"24 for which the Court was
25
established.
In addition, the ICC Statute provides the Court with
jurisdiction over the nationals of nonparty states.26 This practice is
contrary to the fundamental principle of international treaty law,
which provides that only a signatory to a treaty will be bound by its
terms.27 Due to this expansive definition of jurisdiction, the ICC
Statute lacks the legitimacy and support it needs to survive in the
realm of international law. 28 Moreover, the Court's problems are
"exacerbated by the fact that the Statute does not permit
reservations, thus making it impossible for states to accept the
29
Court's jurisdiction with respect to some crimes and not others."
Throughout the negotiating process, the Israeli Government
voiced its concern with regard to several drafting developments
that it considered potentially prejudicial to what should be the
impartial nature and character of the ICC.30 Originally, the
Statute was to be voted on provision-by-provision, but ultimately,
Israel was faced with accepting or rejecting the Statute in its
entirety.31 Affording states an opportunity to object to particular

and Gaza, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 552, 552 n.1 (1988).
23. See War Crimes Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 22, 1998 at 22.
The inclusion of this provision was perceived to be an attempt to abuse the
statute of the Court for political ends, directed principally against Israel ....
The proposed formulation, which had been transcribed from Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, with various adaptations, neither
represented a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, nor did it reflect
customary international law. In fact, it had been cynically adapted and proposed
in order to advance a political viewpoint maintained by certain states.
Alan Baker, The InternationalCriminal Court: Israel'sUnique Dilemma, 18 JUSTICE 19, 24
(1998). See also Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 233-234 n.82.
24. Rome Treaty preamble, supra note 5, at 1002.
25. See id.
26. See Rome Treaty art. 12(3), supra note 5, at 1010.
27. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34-38, 1155
U.N.T.S 331, 341, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
28. See generally Jelena Pejic, Creatinga PermanentInternationalCriminal Court: The
Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 311
(1998).
29. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 234. Article 120 states that "no reservation may
be made to this Statute." Rome Treaty art. 120, supra note 5, at 1066.
30. See Statement by Alan Baker, supranote 9.
31. See id. See also Rome Treaty art. 120, supra note 5, at 1066.
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provisions would have facilitated broader32 acceptance of the ICC
and led to Israel's adoption of the Statute.
While the establishment of the ICC takes international law
one step closer to bringing criminals who commit heinous crimes
to justice, it fails to establish a strong basis for accomplishing this
goal. By examining the ICC's structure and various sources of
international law regarding transfer of population and deportation,
this Comment illustrates the weaknesses in the Statute's war crime
provision that expands the definition of transfer of population into
occupied territory. Part II discusses the ICC's structure and
function. Part III explores the history of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.
Part IV discusses pre-existing international law,
particularly in light of transfer of population and deportation. Part
V examines the Statute's misidentification of Israeli settlement
activity as a war crime. Part VI discusses the role of politics in the
ICC and policy considerations regarding the ICC's overly
expansive jurisdiction.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

As early as 1948, the U.N. General Assembly asked the
International Law Commission (ILC) 33 to examine the possibility
of creating a permanent international criminal court. 34 Prior to the
ICC's creation, the international community relied on ad hoc
tribunals such as those at Nuremberg 35 and Tokyo. 3 6 The ICC
proposal was finally triggered by the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council's creation of two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals in response to the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia 3 7 and Rwanda. 38 Ultimately, the ICC was established
32. See Statement by Judge Eli Nathan, supra note 11.
33. The ILC is "a United Nations advisory group composed of jurists from around the

world, set to work developing a draft code of the law of treaties."

M. JANIS, AN

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1988), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW
114, 114 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3d ed. 1999).

34. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The International Criminal CourtBackground Paper, July 30, 1998 (visited Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il>

[hereinafter ICC Background Paper].
35. See NUREMBERG CHARTER.
36. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special
Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 20 (1946).
37. See Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
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as a permanent judicial body, independent from the U.N., with its
39
seat in the Hague.
From its very inception, however, the ICC faced criticism
when several delegations deplored the inclusion and exclusion of
various acts as crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. 40 Many
commentators believed that "limiting the Court's competence to a
few 'core crimes' would facilitate designing a coherent and unified
approach to the exercise of jurisdiction and the requisite State
cooperation." 4 1 Instead, the Statute, as drafted, hinders the
necessary state cooperation by expanding, rather than limiting, the
Court's jurisdiction. While the Statute excluded such heinous
crimes as terrorism and the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, it supplemented the traditional definition of war crimes
42
to include the transfer of population into an occupied territory.
The Statute's jurisdiction has been assailed as an intrusion on the
43
principle of sovereignty.
A. The InternationalCriminalCourt's Jurisdictionand the
Principleof Complementarity

"National criminal jurisdiction is seen by many states as a
vital aspect of their sovereignty." 4 4 In an attempt to respect that
45
sovereignty, the ICC adopted a principle of complementarity.
This principle of international law helps determine when the ICC
has jurisdiction over a national court and when the ICC can
overrule a national court's verdict.4 6 The principle's basic tenet is
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 84th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
38. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. See also
Stoelting, supra note 2.
39. See ICC Background Paper,supra note 34.
40. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 233. See also David J. Scheffer,
Developments in International Criminal Law: The U.S. and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 12, 18 (1999).
41. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Developments in InternationalCriminal Law: The Rome
Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt, 93 AM. J. INTL. L. 22, 24 (1999).
42. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes with Decision to Establish Permanent
International Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wire Service Stories File [hereinafter U.N. Diplomatic Conference].
43. David S. Bloch & Elon Weinstein, Velvet Glove and Iron Fist. A New Paradigm
for the Permanent War Crimes Court, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 11 (1998).
44. Berg, supra note 17, at 30.
45. See Pejic, supra note 28, at 308. See also ICC Background Paper,supra note 34.
46. See Pejic, supra note 28, at 308.
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that the ICC will complement, rather than replace, national courts
in cases where the necessary trial procedures may not be available
or are possibly ineffective. 47 A case is only admissible to the ICC
unable genuinely" to carry out the
when a state is "unwilling or
48
investigation or prosecution.
Notwithstanding the principle of complementarity, the
Statute nevertheless encroaches on state sovereignty. One of the
fundamental principles of international treaty law is that only a
signatory to a treaty is bound by its terms. 49 Article 12 of the ICC
Statute, however, "reduces the need for ratification of the treaty
by national governments by providing the court with jurisdiction
over the nationals of a nonparty state." 50 "The ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over anyone anywhere in the world, even in the
absence of a referral by the Security Council, if either the state of
the territory where the crime was51 committed or the state of
nationality of the accused consents."
Paradoxically, the Court may not have jurisdiction over
perpetrators of war crimes who are nationals of a state that is
party to the Statute. The Statute permits a state, on becoming a
party, to declare that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the
Court with respect to war crimes alleged to have been
committed b its nationals or on its territory for a period of
seven years.
Plainly, the Court's jurisdiction to try individuals, even when the
state of their nationality is not party to the Statute, disregards the
fundamental principle that a treaty may only bind its own
53
parties.
Under Article 12 of the ICC, for example, an individual
Israeli soldier acting on foreign territory would be subject to the
Court's jurisdiction even if Israel is not a party to the ICC

47. See id.

48. See id. at 309.
49. See Vienna Convention arts. 34-38, supra note 27, at 341.
50. Scheffer, supra note 40, at 18.
51. Id. See Rome Treaty art. 12, supra note 5, at 1010.
52. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 257. See Rome Treaty art. 124, supra note 5, at
1068.
53. See ICC Background Paper,supra note 39. The U.S. Government believes that
the Statute's jurisdiction and application over non-state parties "will pose a serious threat
to its sovereignty." Martin Sieff, Settlements No Crime, Israel Protests; U.S. Says New
Court Invades Sovereignty, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 21, 1998, at Al.
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Treaty. 54 The same holds true if the foreign territory on which the
soldier acts is not a party to the Treaty but consents to the Court's
ad hoc jurisdiction. 55 For example, with only Saddam Hussein's
consent, "even if Iraq does not join the treaty, the treaty text
purports to provide the Court with jurisdiction over American or
other troops involved in international humanitarian action in
northern Iraq, but the Court could not on its own prosecute
Saddam for massacring his own people." 56 As these examples
illustrate, the ICC's ability to extend its jurisdiction to non-party
states infringes on state sovereignty and inhibits states from
contributing efforts to help protect international peace and
57
security.
B. The Role of the Prosecutor
The prosecutor plays a key role in deciding what cases appear
before the Court. Together with the state parties, the Registry, 58
the members of which are elected by the ICC judges, 59 is
responsible for electing the prosecutor. 60 The Office of the
Prosecutor acts independently as a separate organ of the ICC and
does not seek or act on instructions from any internal source. 61
The prosecutor may initiate investigations based on information
62
about crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court.
Further, the prosecutor can "analyze the seriousness of the
information received, and may seek additional information from
states, organs of the U.N., intergovernmental or non-governmental
54. See generally David Scheffer, Development at Rome Treaty Conference, U.S.
DEPT. ST. DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1998, at 19 [hereinafter Scheffer, DISPATCH] (discussing the
ICC's jurisdiction under Article 12).
55. See Scheffer, supra note 40, at 18.
56. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 258.
57. It is important to note that the Statute is not retroactive. See Rome Treaty art. 11,
supra note 5, at 1010. Thus, the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes committed after the
Statute's adoption. See ICC Background Paper,supra note 34.

58. See Rome Treaty art. 43, supra note 5, at 1025. The Registry will be "responsible
for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court." Id.
59. See generally Rome Treaty arts. 35-36, supra note 5, at 1020-1022. The Court will
consist of eighteen judges from eighteen different countries, who will be elected as fulltime members of the Court. See id. See also World Atrocities Court Will be Reality; Over
U.S. Opposition, Treaty Establishes Permanent Tribunal, BALTIMORE SUN, July 18, 1998,

at 1A.
60. See Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 37.
61.

See id.

62. See Rome Treaty art. 53, supra note 5, at 1029.
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organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems
appropriate .... "63 The prosecutor then submits the examination
to the Pre-Trial Chamber, which authorizes further investigation if
the matter falls within the ICC's jurisdiction. 64 Because the
Security Council's power to defer such investigations or
prosecutions for a one-year period is indefinitely renewable, the
Security Council could ultimately prevent a prosecution from
going forward altogether. 65 This factor negatively affects states
that are excluded from the U.N.'s regional grouping system and
66
are therefore precluded from serving on the Security Council.
One criticism of the Court is that the prosecutor has too much
discretion and power in determining whom the ICC will try.6 7 The
Statute creates a "proprio motu-or self-initiating prosecutorwho, on his or her own authority with the consent of two judges,
can initiate investigations and prosecutions without referral to the
[C]ourt of a situation either by a government that is party to the
treaty or by the Security Council. '68 There is a concern "that it
will encourage overwhelming the [C]ourt with complaints and risk
diversion of its resources, as well as embroil the [C]ourt in
controversy, political decision-making, and confusion." 69 The
power of the prosecution, and the manner in which the provisions
of the Statute were decided, essentially on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, 70 plant the seeds for a politically motivated international
judicial body.
C. The InternationalCriminal Court's Enumerated Crimes
The International Law Commission's Draft Statute,7 1 which
the ICC Statute will supplant upon its ratification, states that the
63. U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42.
64. See Rome Treaty art. 15, supra note 5, at 1011.
65. See id. art. 16, at 1012.
66. U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Concludes Consideration of Security
Council Reform, PRESS RELEASE GA/9693, Dec. 20, 1999, available at
<http://www.un.org/search/>.
67. See Scheffer, DISPATCH, supra note 54, at 21.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Statement by Alan Baker, supra note 9. See also Rome Treaty art. 120, supra
note 5, at 1066.
71. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International
Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, U.N. Doc A/48110
(1993).
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Court's jurisdiction shall be limited to the "most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole." 72 These
"core crimes" include crimes against humanity, 73 genocide, 74 war
76
crimes, 75 and the crime of aggression.
There were numerous definitional problems, however, with
regard to the scope of the crime of aggression during the
Preparatory Committee's negotiations. 77 First, it was difficult for
the Committee to define what constitutes "a crime of aggression"
for purposes of the Statute. 78 Any definition of an act of
'"aggression" must account for the fact that aggression may not
always be an individual act, but rather, a cumulative definition of
war itself.79 Second, while some states preferred a fixed and
independent definition of aggression unsusceptible to review by
the Security Council, other states, including the five permanent
members, 80 insisted that the Security Council make a specific
finding that a state did in fact commit an act of aggression. 81 Such
a precondition would give the Security Council, and thus any one
of its permanent members, the power to veto the prosecution of an
individual. 82 Third, many states, including Israel, viewed the
inclusion of aggression in the list of crimes as inappropriate,
arguing that the crime itself is a political one. 83 As a compromise,
the final Statute incorporates the crime of aggression in Article
84
5(2),but leaves the definition to be determined at a later date.

72. U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42. See also Rome Treaty art. 1, supra
note 5, at 1003. See also Berg, supra note 17, at 30. "It was hoped that this limitation
would promote broad acceptance of the Court by states and consequently enhance its
credibility, moral authority and effectiveness." Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 24.
73. See Rome Treaty arts. 5, 7, supra note 5, at 1003-1005.
74. See id. arts. 5-6, at 1003-1004.
75. See id. arts. 5, 8, at 1003-1004, 1006-1009.
76. See id. art, 5, at 1003-1004. See also U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42.
77. See Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 29.
78. See ICC Background Paper,supra note 34.
79. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42.
80. The Security Council's permanent members include the United States, Great
Britain, Russia, China, and France. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, What
is InternationalLaw?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 89.
81. See Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 29. See also Berg, supra note 17, at 30.
82. See Berg, supra note 17, at 30.
83. See ICC Background Paper,supra note 34.
84. See Rome Treaty art. 5(2), supra note 5, at 1004. The Court may exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once it has been defined and the conditions for
such exercise have been agreed upon. See Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 30.
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The following "core crimes" fall within the ICC's jurisdiction
and are generally defined by the Statute in this manner:
'[C]rime against humanity' means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e)
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law; 85 . (f)
Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery .... 86
'[G]enocide' means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) 87Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
'[W]ar crimes' means: (a) Grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949,88 namely, any of the following
acts against persons or property protected under the provisions
of the relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Wilful killing; ... (viii)
Taking of hostages .... (b) Other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within
the established framework of international law,... [including]
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying
Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the
population of the occupied territory within or outside this
89
territory.
There are two crucial limitations on the Court's power that
attempt to prevent politically motivated charges and prejudicial
influences. One limitation is the fundamental ICC principle that
85. "[S]evere deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law..." may raise similar concerns in the context of transfer of population,
however, this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
86. Rome Treaty art. 7(1), supra note 5, at 1004-1005.
87. Id. art. 6, at 1004.
88. See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1.
89. Rome Treaty art. 8, supra note 5, at 1006-1009 (emphasis added).
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the Court is not to create new substantive law, but only to
prosecute crimes international law already prohibits. 90 In addition,
the ICC is not to base its interpretation or application of the
Statute on factors such as language, color, religion, or political
belief. 91 Contrary to these clear limitations, the ICC Statute
expands preexisting international law, 92 thus creating new
substantive law, particularly with respect to defining the crime of
transfer of population. 93 As a result of this new definition, Israeli
settlement activity has been labeled a war crime; 94 this "is an
example of either poor95drafting or deliberate misuse of the Court
for political purposes."
The Statute's definitions of "war crimes" and "crimes against
humanity" are too expansive and leave boundless room for
political manipulation. For example, the overbroad definitions of
"war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" could be applied to
96
actions taken by the United States during the 1991 Gulf War.
According to the ICC Statute, these actions would qualify as war
crimes. 97 Expanding the definition subjects too many states'
actions during recognized hostilities to war crime liability and
ultimately undermines the gravity of war crime prosecutions.
III.

HISTORY OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICr

The Middle East is a region with a rich history dating back
thousands of years. Palestinian-Israeli relations stem from a
combination of law, justice, morality, and history. Asserting rights
to land based on history alone, however, results in inconsistent
conclusions.
From an international legal perspective, the Balfour
Declaration of November 2, 1917,98 is a meaningful starting point
in discussing the Palestine issue. 99 The purpose of the Balfour
90. See Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 25.
91. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42.
92. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 233.
93. See generally id. at 233, 259-60. See also discussion infra Part V.A.
94. See David Frum, The International Criminal Court Must Die, WEEKLY
STANDARD (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 17, 1998, at 27.
95. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 263.
96. See Arsanjani, supra note 41, at 26.
97. See id.
98. See Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the
West Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 221,228 (1997).
99. See Yoram Dinstein, The Arab-Israeli Conflict from the Perspective of
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Declaration was to create a foundation for the establishment of a
Jewish national entity in Palestine. 10 0 After the First World War,
pursuant to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, 10 1 the Middle East was placed under the mandate
system, 10 2 with Palestine assigned to the British Mandate. 10 3 The
preamble of the British Mandate for Palestine incorporated the
Balfour Declaration, thus providing a home for the Jewish people
10 4
in that region.

In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Partition
Resolution, No. 181,105 which was "premised on the termination of
the British Mandate and the establishment of two independent
states, one Jewish and the other Arab, linked by an economic
union, plus a special international regime for the city of Jerusalem
....106 The Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and
10 7
Transjordan) immediately rejected the Partition Resolution,
igniting hostilities between the Jews and Arabs. On May 15, 1948,
Israel declared its independence; within several hours, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, declared war on the new
state. 10 8 In 1949, a series of armistice Agreements 10 9 ended
Israel's war with all Arab armies except Iraq. 110
Under
international law, international borders only become final if and
when they are modified by the bordering countries' mutual
InternationalLaw, 43 U. N.B. L.J. 301, 303 (1994).
100. See id.
101.

See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.

102. A mandate system is one that gives "advanced nations" control over particular
territories in order to help develop them into a self-governing territory. See Shah, supra
note 98, at 228. Britain was designated as the mandatory power for Palestine and was to
render administrative advice and assistance until the region was able to stand alone. See
Allison M. Fahrenkopf, Note, A Legal Analysis of Israel's Deportations of Palestinians
from the Occupied Territories, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125, 132 (1990). Completion of the
Mandate's terms would vest sovereignty in the beneficiaries of the Mandate. See id.
103. See Fahrenkopf,supra note 102, at 132. See also Terms of the British Mandate for
Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations, July 24, 1922, 3 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS O.J. 1007 (1922) (entered into force Sept. 29, 1923).
104. See MARK TESSLER, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 158

(Salih J. Altoma et al. eds., Ind. Univ. Press 1994).
105. See G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
106. Dinstein, supra note 99, at 306.
107. See Shah, supra note 98, at 228.
108. See Dinstein, supra note 99, at 308.
109. See, e.g., General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Egypt-Isr., 42 U.N.T.S.
252; General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 3, 1949, Jordan-Isr., 42 U.N.T.S 304.
110. See Dinstein, supra note 99, at 308.
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consent.111 As a result, until Israel and its bordering neighbors
mutually agreed on the location of their borders, the scope of the
territory constituting their respective sovereign lands was not
112
"final."
113
The 1947-1948 War resulted in numerous boundary shifts.
Historically, Gaza was never an integral part of Egypt, but rather a
narrow coastal strip of Palestine running north from the IsraeliEgyptian border. 114 At the conclusion of the 1947-1948 War,
Jordan controlled the West Bank. 115 In 1950, the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan formally annexed the territory. 116 The West
Bank was of great strategic importance to Israel because of its
117
mountainous geography.
In June 1967, Egypt amassed troops along the Israel-Egypt
armistice line, requested that the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF)
withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, 118 and closed the Straits of
Tiran to Israeli shipping.119 In response to these acts of
aggression, Israel invaded Egypt. 120 Shortly thereafter, Jordan and
Syria attacked Israel. 121 Eventually, Israel captured the Sinai
Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from
123
Jordan, 122 and the Golan Heights from Syria.
The "[c]apture of the West Bank, along with Gaza, gave
Israel control over the territory that had been allocated for Jewish
111. See id. at 308-309.
112. See id.
113. In addition, as a result of the 1947-1948 War, thousands of Palestinian Arabs lost
their homes. See id. There has been great debate surrounding the origin of this
population displacement. See Behnam Dayanim, The Israeli Supreme Court and the
Deportationsof Palestinians:The Interaction of Law and Legitimacy, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
115, 123-124 (1994). Many adherents to the Palestinian perspective assert that the Jewish
people were responsible for the expulsion. See id. Other commentators contend that a
combination of social and political factors contributed to the vast numbers of Arab
refugees. See id.
114. See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 401.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 403.
118. Following a military confrontation between Egypt and Israel in 1956, the U.N. put
an emergency force (UNEF) on the Egyptian side of the 1949 armistice line to assure
there were no further hostilities.

See JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A

CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 156 (Duke Univ. Press 1990).
119. See id. at 162.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122.
123.

See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 399.
See QUIGLEY, supra note 118, at 163.
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and Palestinian states under the United Nations Partition
Resolution of 1947. "1124 As a result, many refugees fled the Israeli
occupied territory and many remaining Palestinian Arabs were
placed under Israeli military administration. 125 With the Israeli
army's assistance, Israeli settlements were established along the
perimeters of the occupied territories. 126 Security considerations
motivated their construction as part of the military's effort to
prevent infiltration of the oppositions' forces. 127 Some Israeli
128
citizens also undertook settlement activity after the 1967 War.
The Israeli Government, however, did not plan to annex the West
Bank and Gaza. 129 In November 1967, the U.N. adopted
Resolution 242130 requesting that Israel withdraw from the
occupied territories as part of a general settlement with the Arab
countries. 131 It was unclear, however, "whether withdrawal was to
be from all the territories it had occupied, or only from some
portion," 132 and3 whether peace was a prerequisite for withdrawal
13
or vice versa.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise
134
attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement.
Continuous fighting ensued and by October 24, 1973, Israel
improved its position and recaptured territory it lost in the'
135
beginning days of the war.
Following the 1973 War, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) dramatically improved its political strength
with a new emphasis on political dialogue. 136 In 1977, the Camp
124. TESSLER, supra note, 104, at 401-402.
125. See id. at 402.
126. In this Comment, the word "territories" refers both to the areas seized from
Jordan during the Six-Day War in 1967 and to Gaza. See U.N. Security Council, Focus on
Situationin Occupied Territories,U.N. CHRON., Oct. 1983, at 3.
127. See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 466.

128. See id.
129. See id. at 467.
130. See S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR 22d Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 242].
131. See id.
132.

QUIGLEY supra note 118, at 170.

133. See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 468. According to a report prepared by Israel's
Ministry of Defense, U.N. Resolution 242 "confirmed Israel's right to administer the
captured territories until the cease-fire was superseded by a 'just and lasting peace' arrived
at between Israel and her neighbors." Id.
134.

See id. at 474-475.

135. See id. at 477.
136. See id. at 483.
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David Accords ultimately resulted in a peace treaty between Israel
and Egypt. 137 The Camp David Accords called for Israel's return
of the Sinai to Egypt and set the stage for negotiations about the
future of the West Bank and Gaza. 138 During the 1970s and 1980s,
the PLO continued to gain political support in139the occupied
territories and Israeli settlement activity expanded.
The Palestinians demanded autonomy and eventually, in
December 1987, spontaneous and violent protest demonstrations,
also known as the Intifada, erupted throughout the occupied
territories. 140 These uprisings were a response to the Israeli
stronghold military administration in the occupied territories,
disappointment with the PLO leadership, and the Palestinians'
strained relationships with Jordan. 141 The Palestinians' new
assertiveness and resistance to the Israeli occupation
seeped into
142
the Israeli public and political consciousness.
In the aftermath of the Intifada, new diplomatic efforts led to
U.S.-sponsored peace talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors,
143
including negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
Both parties acknowledged the need to end the conflict and
144
recognized their mutual legitimate political rights.
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to
a Declaration of Principles (DOP), 145 which, among other things,
established a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority that
would lead to a permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolutions 242146 and 338.147 As of November 1999, final status
137. See id. at 514-515.
138. See id. at 516.
139. See id. at 483,516.
140. See id. at 677.
141. See id. at 677,714-715.
142. See id. at 707-708.
143. See id. at 713.
144. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, preamble, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1527 (1993) [hereinafter DOP]. See also
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995, Isr.-PLO, 36 I.L.M. 551, 558 (1997) [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
145. See DOP art. I, supra note 144, at 1527.
146. See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 130. Resolution 242 called for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forced from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict and for termination of the state
of belligerency. See id.
147. Resolution 338 called for a cease-fire and reaffirmed the provisions of Resolution
242. See S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1757th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973).
See also DOP art. I, supra note 144, at 1527.
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negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority had yet
to take place.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIOR TO THE ICC AND TRANSFER OF
POPULATION

The ICC's foundation draws on a rich history of various
international treaties and conferences. "A rule of international
law is one that has been accepted as such by the international
community of states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by
international agreement; (c) or by derivation from general
principles common to the major legal systems of the world. ' 148 As
an international agreement, the ICC Statute may be accepted as
international law, but should, in accordance with fundamental
principles of international law, only bind its own signatories. 149
Customary international law 150 is rooted in an effort to
achieve peace, security, and justice. The Hague Convention1 51 and
the Geneva Conference 152 are two recent influences on the
structure of customary international law and the creation of the

ICC. The ICC Statute derives from a combination of various
international tools and experiences. Its mere creation, however,
does not automatically render it binding on the international
community solely as a matter of customary international law. 153
Therefore, to determine whether Israeli settlements fall under
the ICC's definition of war crimes, it is crucial to determine what
preexisting international law does, and does not, permit. This Part
analyzes the act of transfer of population from a historical
perspective by examining some of the ICC's predecessors: the

148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS].
149. See Vienna Convention art. 34, supra note 27, at 341.
150. Customary international law results from the general and consistent practice of
states that follow such law out of a sense of legal obligation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 102. See also discussion infra Part IV.C.
151. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 The Hague
Convention), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
152. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1. A plethora of international agreements
have influenced customary international law and ultimately the creation of the ICC; for
purposes of this Comment, however, the examination is limited to customary international
law, the Hague Convention, and the Geneva Conference.
153. See discussion infra Part IV.C. Customary international laws "evolve after a long
historical process culminating in their recognition by the international community."
CARTER & TRIMBLE, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 134.
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Hague Convention, 15 4 the Geneva Convention, 155 and customary
international law.
A. The Hague Convention
The current status of deportation and transfer of population is
greatly influenced by their historical treatment under the Hague
Convention. 156 The 1907 Hague Convention, often referred to as
the Law of War, established the rights and obligations of
belligerent military operations, and limited the means belligerents
157
could employ to harm their enemies.
Section III of the Hague Convention, entitled Military
Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State, defines an
occupied territory as an area that is "actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army." 158 This section places several
limitations on the exercise of military authority over an enemy
state's occupied territory. 159 The regulations in section III do not
explicitly prohibit the deportation or settlement of civilians within
160
an occupied territory.
Arguably, the omission of deportation in the Hague
Regulations is due to the fact that the use of deportation and
population transfer as a policy tool had fallen into disuse at the
time of the Convention's drafting. 161 Such an argument, however,
does not imply that the parties intended to prohibit deportation or
transfer of population. 62 Article 43 of the Hague Convention
states that the occupying power "shall take all measures in [its]
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country."' 163 As a result, the language of Article 43
anticipates the possibility of occupation and therefore includes
164
restrictions and guidelines during such occupation.
154. See Hague Convention, supra note 151.
155. See Geneva Convention IV art. 49, supra note 1, at 3548.
156. See Hague Convention, supra note 151.
157. See International Committee of the Red Cross, International HumanitarianLaw
sec. 1 (visited Oct. 23, 1998) <http:www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews...>.
158. Hague Convention art. 42, supra note 151.
159. See id.
160. See generally id. Annex, § 3.
161. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 140.
162. See id.
163. Hague Convention art. 43, supra note 151.
164. See generally id.
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Article 43165 requires that an occupant preserve the occupied
territory's existing laws. Because there was no existing Palestinian
law in the West Bank and Gaza prior to Israeli occupation,
however, it is arguable that Article 43 does not apply.166 Further,
Jordan relinquished any claims to the West Bank1 67 and Egypt
never claimed the Gaza Strip as part of its country. 168 In
accordance with Article 43, in order to restore and ensure public
order and safety, some form of law enforcement must rule the
occupied territory. 169 In the absence of an official governing
system functioning in the occupied area, Israel implemented its
own policies, law, and enforcement mechanisms to maintain order,
as the Hague Regulations mandate. 170
Therefore, Israel's
implementation of its own law enforcement, under these
circumstances, may very well have been required by the Hague
171
Regulations.
The Hague Convention also fails to distinguish deportations
from settlements. 172 Nevertheless, the notorious Nazi practice of
annexing territories and establishing "Aryan" civilian settlements
in occupied territories was deemed a violation of the Hague
Convention. 173 Because the Israeli settlements are in no way
comparable to the Nazi atrocities, it is difficult to assess the
applicability of the Convention's rules to the settlement activity.
Unlike the Nazi transfers, which were used for purposes of "forced
servitude or physical annihilation,' 74 there is "no body of
evidence ...

of large-scale transfers of Arabs from the occupied

territories." 175 Moreover, the absence of Palestinian residency in
the many parts of the territory at the time of Israeli occupation

165. See id.
166. See generally Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 457, 473, 487, 492 (1991) (discussing the inapplicability of the Hague
Convention to the West Bank and Gaza).
167.

See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 715.

168. See QUIGLEY, supra note 118, at 153.
169. See Hague Convention art. 43, supra note 151.
170. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 140.
171. See id.
172. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 151.
173. See Craig Jackson, Israeli West Bank Settlements, the Reagan Administration's
Policy Toward the Middle East and InternationalLaw, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 217,
227-228 (1987).
174. Dayanim, supra note 113, at 141.
175. Jackson, supra note 173, at 231.
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population was
precludes the argument that the Palestinian
176
occupation.
Israeli
of
result
a
as
deported
While the Hague Convention does not expressly prohibit
deportations, the practice is arguably incompatible with Article 46,
which states: "[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must
be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. ' 177 This
argument, however, fails to classify settlements as violations of
Article 46 because most of the Israeli settlements were established
on uncultivated and unregistered land. 178 These areas are
considered state land and are therefore subject instead to Article
55, which states that the occupant is regarded as administrator and
usufructuary of such property. 179 Consequently, Israeli settlement
activity is based on the occupant's (Israel's) authority to
administer and utilize governmental property under Article 55,180
and therefore does not violate Article 46.
There is some debate regarding the Hague Convention's
formal applicability to the occupied territories. 181 The Israeli
Government, for example, has not acknowledged the Hague
Regulations' de jure applicability to the Israeli occupied
territories. 182 The Israeli Supreme Court, however, has accorded
the Hague Regulations the status of customary international law
183
applicable to the Israeli administration of the territories.
Despite the debate over the Hague Convention's applicability,
there is a general consensus within Israel and the international
community that Israel accepts that the Hague Convention governs
184
the occupied territories on either a de facto or a de jure basis.

176. See generally Zak, supra note 13, at 8A.
177. Hague Convention art. 46, supra note 151.
178. See Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future
of Israeli-PalestinianSettlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 314 n.106 (1995).

179. See Hague Convention art. 55, supra note 151. "Usufructuary" is defined as one
who has a right of limited duration to use and enjoy another's property. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1990).
180. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 178, at 314-315.
181. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied
TerritoriesSince 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 63 (1994).

182. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 139.
183. See id.

184. See Roberts, supra note 181, at 63.
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B. The Geneva Convention

On August 12, 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention was
adopted largely in response to the Nazi atrocities committed
during World War 11.185 It was created to address the protection
186
of civilians during international and domestic armed conflicts.
In determining the legality of Israeli settlements under the Geneva
Convention, it is important to determine (1) whether the
Convention constitutes customary or conventional law; and (2)
whether the Convention applies to the overall situation in the
occupied territories.
1. Does the Geneva Convention Constitute Customary
International Law?
Ascertaining whether the Geneva Convention constitutes
customary international law is important in determining its binding
authority on nation-states.
Customary international law is
internationally binding and results from the general and consistent
practice of states following such law out of a sense of legal
obligation. 18 7
Considering that the Geneva Convention
represented an attempt to expand and update the Hague
Regulations, 188 it is arguable that the Geneva Convention
represents customary international law and thus applies to Israel's
occupied territories.
Some scholars claim that the Geneva
Convention and many of the humanitarian norms it embodies have
acquired the status of jus cogens.1 8 9 Conversely, unlike the Hague
Regulations, "the Fourth Geneva Convention has not been
regarded as solely representative of customary international law.
Thus, it is legally binding only on those states who are parties to

185. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 159.
186. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1. See also Protocol I, Protocol II, supra
note 1.
187.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 102 (2)

(1986).
188. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 147. The Israeli Supreme Court accorded the
Hague Regulations customary law status applicable to the Israeli territories. See id. at 139.
189. See id. at 151-152. Jus cogens is an international principal that means
"peremptory norms," which is "said to be so fundamental that states cannot agree to
contravene it." CARTER & TRIMBLE, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 125.
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 356 (Pocket ed. 1996) (defining the term, "jus
cogens," as a "mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or more
nations may exempt themselves or release one another.").
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it." 190 The Israeli High Court has consistently treated the Geneva
Convention as conventional law, non-self-executing, 191 and
therefore non-binding unless specifically incorporated into Israeli
193
law. 192 In addition, Protocol I of the Geneva Convention
"cannot be considered customary international law because many
major powers, including Britain, France, Japan, and the United
194
States, have not acceded to it."
As the above arguments illustrate, great debate continues to
surround the issue of whether the Geneva Convention constitutes
customary international law. 195 Even if the Convention is afforded
196
such status, however, Israel could still be a "persistent objector"
to the Convention's application to the settlements. Under the
"persistent objector" principle, if a dissenting state consistently
opposes a law in its formative period, that law does not apply to
that state. 197 Israel objected to the claim that the settlements are
illegal and expressed that "the establishment of any settlement is
predicated upon an extensive analysis of the title to land
concerned, as well as an intricate appeals procedure.., in order to
ensure that private rights are not prejudiced. ' 198 Alternatively, if
190. Shah, supra note 98, at 241. A fundamental international principle is that a treaty
does not bind non-parties. See Vienna Convention art. 34, supra note 27, at 341.
191. A self-executing treaty operates on its own force and, unlike a non-self-executing
treaty, does not need legislation to effectuate it domestically. See generally CARTER &
TRIMBLE, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 185.
192. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 153. See also Israel Supreme Court Judgment in
Cases ConcerningDeportation Orders, Apr. 10, 1988, 29 I.L.M. 139, 149 (1990) (discussing
H.C.785/87, Affo v. Commander of Israeli Defense Forces in the West Bank, where the
Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged that the Geneva Convention is not part of customary
international law). Conventional treaties do not become binding as domestic law unless
formally incorporated through enabling legislation by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament).
See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 153.
193. See Protocol I, supra note 1. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention of August
12, 1949 addresses the protection of victims of international armed conflicts. Protocol I
addresses the protection of victims on non-international armed conflicts. See id.
194. Curtis, supra note 166, at 480.
195. See Justus R. Weiner, Human Rights in Limbo During the Interim Period of the
IsraeliPalestinianPeace Process:Review, Analysis, and Implications, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 761, 766-767 (1995).
196. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 102 cmt. d.
This principle is sometimes referred to as "the principle of the persistent objector." Louis
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 89 (3d ed. 1993).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 102 cmt. d.
See also OSCAR SCHACHTER, InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice, in 178 REC. DES
COURS 111-121 (1982), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 139,143.
198. Alan Baker & Ady Schonmann, Presenting Israel's Case Before International
Human Rights Bodies (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp>.
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the Geneva Convention does not constitute customary
international law and Israel rejects its applicability to the
territories, then the Convention would not apply to the
settlements.
If the Geneva Convention does represent customary
international law, or the Israeli High Court declares the
Convention self-executing or incorporates it into Israeli domestic
law, the question becomes whether the Israeli settlement activity
violates the Geneva Convention.
Article 49 provides that
"[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not,
are prohibited, regardless of their motive." 199 The Geneva
Convention's drafters adopted this provision to prevent transfers
of population like those the Nazis committed in Czechoslovakia,
200
Poland, and Hungary before and during the Second World War.
According to the authoritative International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) commentary, the purpose of Article 49 was to
"prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by
certain powers, which transferred portions of their own population
to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as
' 20 1
they claimed, to colonise these territories."
2. Israeli Settlements and the Geneva Convention
Israel ratified the Geneva Convention in 1951202 but has not
yet ratified the Geneva Protocols I or 11.203 Israel, however,
refuses to accept the Fourth Geneva Convention's full de jure
applicability to the occupied territories. 20 4 The Israeli High Court
has thus far avoided directly addressing the Convention's
applicability to the territories 20 5 and has repeatedly refused to
accept that the Convention has acquired customary international
199. Geneva Convention IV art. 49, supra note 1, at 3548.
200. See Israel Foreign Ministry, Israel's Settlements- Their Conformity with
InternationalLaw (last modified Dec. 1996) <www.israel-mfa.gov.il>. See also Jean-Marie
Henckaerts, Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 469, 471 (1993).
201. Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200.
202. See Roberts, supra note 181, at 62.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Dayanim, supra note 113, at 143-144.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 22:207

law status. 20 6 In contrast, "proponents of the Convention's
applicability present their strongest case when invoking the
overarching purposes of
the Geneva Convention and the very fact
20 7
itself."
occupation
of
It is worth noting, that "among the many states that have
captured territory in recent decades, only Israel has undertaken to
apply the Geneva Convention on even a de facto basis." 20 8 Israeli
military officials have, in fact, instructed Israeli soldiers to abide by
the Convention's provisions, 20 9 and have rejected any allegations
made by the international community that Israel has violated the
Convention. 210 The view that the Fourth Geneva Convention
should apply in the occupied territories is nevertheless widely
211
accepted in the international arena.
One of Article 49's salient features is that it only prohibits
"forcible" transfers, and thus does not absolutely prohibit all
transfers. 212 The plain reading of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which speaks of "forced" transfer of population, 213 makes
classifying
voluntary settlements
as "forced"
transfers
troublesome. In fact, the United States recognizes Israel's reading
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 214 As a result, in 1983, despite
its vocal opposition to Israeli settlements, the U.S. Government
shifted from classifying the settlements as "illegal" to labeling
215
them "obstacles to peace."
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention's reference to
"unlawful deportation or transfer" 216 implies that some
deportations and settlements are lawful because of the voluntary
nature of the deportation or settlement. 217 Some scholars argue
that the "word 'deportation' in [A]rticle 49 is a term of art,
206. See Uri Shoham, The Principleof Legality and the Israeli Military Government in
the Territories, 153 MIL. L. REV. 245, 250 (1996).

207. Dayanim, supra note 113, at 143.
208. Weiner, supra note 195, at 768-769. See also Shoham, supra note 206, at 250.
209. See Shoham, supra note 206, at 250.
210. See Statement by Judge Eli Nathan, supra note 11.
211. See Roberts, supra note 181, at 69.
212. See Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 472.
213. See Another U.N. Obscenity, JERUSALEM POST, July 20, 1998, at-08, available in
1998 WL 6532789.
214.
215.

See id.

Id.
216. Geneva Convention IV art. 147, supra note 1.
217. See Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 472.
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referring to German atrocities during World War II.,,218 Thus, "[i]t
is 'essentially unrelated to the measure employed by Israel, which
is more a form of banishment or expulsion to protect the security
of the state."' 219 "The existence of Israeli settlements in these
areas is a continuation of a long-standing Jewish presence ....
[T]he movement of individuals to these areas is entirely voluntary
while the settlements themselves are not intended to displace Arab
inhabitants, nor do they do so in practice." 220 While these
settlements are often considered a prelude to annexation, which
Article 47 of the Geneva Convention absolutely prohibits, 221 Israel
nor has it devised a plan, to
has neither expressed any desire,
222
annex the occupied territories.
The contention that Israeli settlements on the West Bank
violate Article 49(6) has gained extraordinary support in the U.S.,
Arab, Israeli, and international political arenas.223 Although
Israel's occupation purportedly violates certain provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, "[u]nlike the Hague Regulations, the
Fourth Geneva Convention has not been regarded as solely
representative of customary international law." 224 Moreover, the
authoritative Hague Convention, which does reflect customary
international law, does not espouse the same prohibition225against
deportation as does Article 49 of the Geneva Convention.
Even if the Geneva Convention constitutes customary
international law, Israel's activity in the occupied territories is
completely incomparable with the atrocities that Article 49 was
designed to prevent. 226 Although many Palestinians in the
occupied territories have endured hardship during Israeli
occupation, Israel has made no institutionalized attempt to destroy
the Palestinian people economically or exterminate them as a race,
as was the case in the Second World War. 227 "As contrasted with
218. Dayanim, supra note 113, at 164.
219. Id. at 164 n.244.
220. Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200.
221. See Thomas Kuttner, Israel and the West Bank: Aspects of the Law of Belligerent
Occupation, 7 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 166, 218 (1977).
222. See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 467.
223. See Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 477.
224. Shah, supra note 98, at 241.
225. See Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 484.
226. See Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200.
227. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 262. See also JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND
PALESTINE 178 (1981).
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this main evil at which Article 49 was aimed, the diversion of the
meaning of paragraph 6 to justify prohibition of the voluntary
settlement of Jews in Judea and Sumaria (the West Bank) carries
'22 8
an irony bordering on the absurd.
C. Customary InternationalLaw
Customary international law results from the general and
consistent practice of states that follow such law out of a sense of
legal obligation. 2 29 Customary international law is comprised of
two elements: first, states' common and consistent behavior under
like circumstances; 230 and second, that the behavior results from a
sense of legal obligation to follow such practices. 23 1 Therefore,
customary international law does not derive from one source, but
rather, is a compilation of states' common behavior as it evolves
over time.
For a treaty to become binding as customary
international law, it must become a generalized and consistent
practice among states. 232 Because the ICC Statute was recently
adopted, it has not yet obtained sufficient ratification to put it into
force 2 33 or received the opportunity to establish itself as custom.
1. Sovereignty and the Principle of the Persistent Objector
A predominant principle of customary international law is the
concept of state sovereignty, which is the notion that "a nation is
master in its own territory." 234 State sovereignty is an issue
whenever allegations that internal actions violate international law
arise. 23 5 Sovereignty is a widely accepted theory that goes beyond
legal theory; it reflects conceptions of international order that
228. STONE, supra note 227, at 180.
229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 102 (2).
230. See generally id.
231. See generally id.
232. See id.
233. See RatificationStatus, supra note 8.
234. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 13-27 (2d ed. 1979), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 31, 33.
235. See id. The issue of whether international law can be properly deemed "law," and
why is it binding on "sovereign" states, is complex and subject to various theories. See
CARTER & TRIMBLE, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 39. For purposes of
this Comment, the discussion of sovereignty will not extend beyond the basic rule of
international law that: "a state generally has the exclusive authority to regulate conduct
within its territory." Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 833-834 (1990), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 33, at 46, 46 (emphasis added).
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influence political and legal decisions. 236 "The principle of nonintervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct
"..."237
Although the
its affairs without outside interference .
principle of sovereignty is often violated,238 the International
Court of Justice 239 considers it an integral part of customary
international law. 240 It is arguable that there can be "no . . .
'international democracy' in which a majority or representative
proportion of states is considered to speak in the name of all and
thus be entitled to impose its will on other states." 241 Therefore,
the ICC has the potential to undemocratically impose its will on
other states by expanding the definition of universally recognized
war crimes and subjecting non-party states to the Court's
jurisdiction. Consequently, once the ICC is established "it is more
likely to expand its own jurisdiction at the expense of state
sovereignty" 242 and intervene in another state's national policies.
The adoption of new laws does not necessarily bind states that
expressly objected to the implementation of such laws. The
consensus in the international legal community is that:
[A] customary rule may arise notwithstanding the opposition of
one State, or even perhaps a few States, provided that otherwise
the necessary degree of generality is reached. But they also
seem to lay down that the rule so created will not bind the
objectors; in other words, that in international law there is no
rule even with respect to the formation of customary
majority
3
law.

24

As discussed earlier, the "persistent dissenter" principle in the
Restatement (Third),244 acknowledges that "in principle a state that
236. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 196, at 53.
237. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 35 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
238. See id.
239. The Permanent Court of International Justice was established in 1921 at the
Hague to be succeeded in 1946 by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). See John H.
Barton & Barry E. Carter, InternationalLaw and Institutionsfor a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J.
535 (1993), reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 16. The I.C.J. is probably
the principal forum for resolving certain forms of legal issues between states. See id.,
reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 20.

240. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 35.
241. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413,420 (1983).
242. Bloch & Weinstein, supra note 43, at 11.
243. HENKIN ETAL., supra note 196, at 87.
244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 102 cmt. d.
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indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the
process of development is not bound by that rule even after it
matures." 245 This principle provides an objecting state with a tool
for negotiating with proponents of a new international law and
limits the international community's ability to infringe on state
sovereignty.
Accordingly, Israel has persistently objected to application of
the transfer of population principle to the occupied territories and
to allegations that the settlements violate customary international
law. 24 6 From the moment the ICC drafting committee expanded
the definition of "transfer of population," implicating Israeli
settlement activity, the Israeli Government made its opposition
clear. 247
Assuming the ICC Statute attains customary
international law status, Israel, as a persistent objector, has a
convincing claim that it is not bound by this particular provision.
Because the ICC Statute has not yet risen to the level of
customary international law, states do not have an opportunity to
persistently object. At the same time, unlike the fundamental
principle that a treaty binds only its signatories, 248 the ICC Statute
has the potential to subject non-parties to the Court's
jurisdiction. 249 Thus, the ICC Statute departs from pre-existing
practice by leaving little, if any, room for a state to determine the
course it will follow in the development of international law. This
practice could amount to blatant infringement on state
sovereignty.
2. Customary International Law of Human Rights
In the area of human rights, customary international law is
violated if a state practices, encourages, or condones: (1) genocide,
slavery or slave trade; (2) murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals; (3) torture or inhumane punishment; (4) prolonged
arbitrary detention; (5) systematic racial discrimination; or (6)
consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized

245.

Id.

246. See generally Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200; Shoham, supra note 206;
Sieff, supra note 53. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 181, at 63 n.56 (noting that Israel has
"always voted against the applicability of the [Geneva] Convention.").
247. See generally Statement by Alan Baker, supra note 9.
248. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27.
249. See Rome Treaty art. 12, supra note 5, at 1010.
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human rights. 250 This list of violations does not directly include
transfer of population as a violation of customary international
law. Unless the act is deemed a "consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights," 25 1 it is arguable that transfer of
population does not amount to a war crime under customary
252
international law.
Customary humanitarian international law was applied in the
"Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 25 3 which dealt with the most
notorious instance of wartime deportations that occurred in the
period after the adoption of Hague-the Nazi atrocities during
World War II.,,254 The Nuremberg Charter changed the concept
of national sovereignty by enforcing international norms governing
the conduct of armed conflict against the accused, individually or
255
in their capacity as members of organizations or groups.
Political, racial, and colonization ends motivated Nazi Germany's
mass transfers of population across internationally recognized
borders .256
The Nuremberg Charter charged the Nazi war criminals with
''crimes against humanity," "war crimes" and "crimes against the
peace." 25 7 Article 6(b) of the Charter defines "war crimes" as
including "murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory." 258 Article 6(c) defines "crimes against humanity" as
including "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other
inhumane
acts
committed
against
any
civilian
259
population."
Nazi Germany's forced expulsions of civilian populations,
mass deportations for purposes of forced labor, and intent to

250. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 702. See
also HENKIN ETAL., supra note 196, at 615.
251. HENKIN ETAL., supra note 196, at 616.
252. See generally id. at 616-617.
253. See id. at 601.
254. Dayanim, supra note 113, at 141.
255. See Henry T. King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
143-144 (1998).
256. See STONE, supra note 227, at 178. See also Herbert J. Hansell, Letter from State
Department Legal Adviser Concerning Legality of Israeli Settlements in the Occupied
Territories,17 I.L.M. 777, 779 (1978).
257. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 196, at 601. See also Dayanim, supra note 113, at 141.
258. NUREMBERG CHARTER art. 6(b).
259. Id. art. 6(c).
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exterminate national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups,260 led to
an unprecedented number of deportations and population
transfers, which constituted war crimes and crimes against
humanity under the Nuremberg principles. 261
Some
commentators equate the Nuremberg Military Tribunal's
262
conception of deportations with the Israeli expulsion practices.
Others interpret the Charter as referring to deportation solely in
the context in which the Nazis used it: for purposes of forced
servitude or physical annihilation. 263
"While the 'correct'
interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter lies open to debate, the
weight of scholarly opinion tends to discount the view that... non264
Nazi-style expulsions, are prohibited under the Charter."
On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) 2 65 to

prosecute

serious

violations

of

international

humanitarian law, including "mass killing, massive, organized and
systematic detention and rape of women, and the continuance of
the practice of 'ethnic cleansing'. ...
"266 The ICTY concluded that
population transfer and deportation in the form of ethnic cleansing
or mass expulsion constituted both war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 267 "[T]he massive, gross and systematic human rights
violations occurring in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina...
committed in connection with the systematic policy of 'ethnic
cleansing' and genocidal acts . . ."268 resulted in an estimated
200,000 people killed or missing since the Bosnian War's
269
inception.
As Nuremberg and the ICTY illustrate, the acts of
deportation and transfer of population that have been declared
war crimes are the types of acts that utterly shock the conscience.
260. See STONE, supra note 227, at 178-179. See also Dayanim, supra note 113, at 141.
261. See Christopher M. Goebel, A Unified Concept of Population Transfer, 21 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29, 31-32 (1992).
262. See Dayanim, supra note 113, at 141.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 142. See also Ruth Lapidoth, The Expulsion of Civiliansfrom Areas Which
Came Under Israeli Controlin 1967: Some Legal Issues, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 97, 98 (1990).
265. See ICTY Statute, supra note 37.
266. Id.
267. Alfred de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L.F. 257,259 (1995).
268. Id. at 281.
269. See id. at 272.
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It is clear from precedent and development of the law regarding
the types of acts constituting a transfer of population war crime,
that the settling of individual civilians into Israel's occupied
territories does not amount to a prosecutable offense.
V. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE ICC STATUTE

The ICC Statute classifies transfer of population as a war
crime. 270
The Statute's language implies that the Israeli
271
in fact, fall within the "war crime" definition.
do,
settlements
The issue of Israeli settlements, however, is inseparable from the
context in which it arises. 272 The nature of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, the Oslo negotiations, 273 including the Declaration of
Principles (DOP),274 and the effect of customary international law,
collectively illustrate the misapplication of the ICC Statute to the
Israeli settlements.
A. The ICC Statute Does Not Accurately Reflect Preexisting
InternationalLaw
Treaties typically govern international relations. On occasion,
however, a principle may be so important that the international
community regards it as customary international law even in the
absence of a formal treaty.275 The international community
accepts the following practices as the building blocks of
international human rights law: adherence to the U.N. Charter and

270. See Rome Treaty art. 8(2)(b)(viii), supra note 5, at 1007.
271. See PalestinianLeaders, supra note 13. See also War Crimes Court, supra note 23;
Frum, supra note 94, at 27.
272. See generally Curtis, supra note 166, at 464 (stating that "Israel's present
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was brought about by attempts of Arab states to
Because it
change the Mideast map by threatening Israel with annihilation in 1967 ....
was the result of Israel's legitimate actions taken in self-defense, the occupation cannot be
regarded as illegal.").
273. Oslo I is known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr-PLO. See Interim Agreement, supra note 144. See also
Yehuda Z. Blum, From Camp David to Oslo, 28 ISR. L. REV. 211, 211 (1994). In 1993,
bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians took place in the Norwegian capital,
Oslo, which resulted in the signing of the DOP, which states that Israel and the PLO
"recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive
peace settlement ... " Id. at 214. See DOP preamble, supra note 144, at 1527.
274. See DOP, supra note 144.
275. See generally HENKIN ETAL., supra note 196, at 617.
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its human rights provisions;2 76 virtual universal acceptance of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 27 7 and state participation
in preparing and adopting international agreements recognizing
human rights. 278 A population's right not to be transferred is
neither listed in the U.N. Charter 27 9 nor in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 2 80 Additionally, as noted earlier,
customary international law, as defined by the Restatement
(Third), does not classify transfer of population as a violation of
281
the customary international law of human rights.
The Geneva Convention is the only international law that
directly prohibits settlements, 2 82 but it is disputable whether the
Geneva Convention has achieved customary international law
status. 2 83 To the extent that the Geneva Convention constitutes
customary international law, the ICC Statute inappropriately
expands the Geneva Convention's definition of transfer of
population 2 84 to include acts outside the scope of the preexisting
definition. 2 85 Furthermore, the ICC Statute strays from the wellrecognized principle that a treaty only binds its signatories. 286 For
all of these reasons, the ICC Statute fails to accurately reflect
preexisting international law.
The language in Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the ICC Statute
departs from preexisting international law, particularly the Geneva
Convention IV,2 87 by defining the prohibition against deportation
and population transfer in a new way. It prohibits "the transfer,
directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies." 2 88 The Statute's drafters
276. See id. (referring to the U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1, 13, 55, 62, 68, 76).
277. See G.A.Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
278. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 196, at 618.
279. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56. See also generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3),
62(2), 68, 76(c).
280. See generally G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 277.
281.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 148, § 702.

See

also HENKIN ET AL., supra note 196, at 615.
282. See Goebel, supra note 261, at 42.
283. See Shah, supra note 98, at 241.
284. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention states that "[t]he Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."
Geneva Convention IV art. 49, supra note 1, at 3548.
285. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 260.
286. See Vienna Convention art. 34, supra note 27, at 341.
287. See Geneva Convention IV art. 49, supra note 1, at 3548.
288. Rome Treaty art. 8(2)(b)(viii), supra note 5, at 1007 (emphasis added).
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added the words "indirectly or directly" to the Geneva
Convention's definition of transfer of population, and thereby
created the "concern . . . that you could have transfers of
population that would fall within the ambit of the Statute that
289
might not now be covered, but could be covered in the future."
The ICRC interprets the "inclusion of 'indirect' to indicate
that the population of the occupying power need not necessarily
be physically forced or otherwise compelled. '290 Although acts of
inducement or facilitation may fall under this war crime definition,
the requirement that the transfer must be executed "by the
Occupying Power" 291 implies government involvement. 292 The
debate over the voluntary nature of the Israeli settlements and the
extent of the Israeli Government's involvement continues. 293 The
fact that nationals of the occupying power choose to voluntarily
settle into the occupied territory dilutes government culpability. 294
While "there are legal difficulties inherent in defining
'voluntary"' 295 because settlements may also be "facilitated by a
government's actions,"296 individuals who move to these areas do
so voluntarily and without the intent to displace Palestinian
297
inhabitants.
It is important to note that there is also debate as to whether
Israel actually "occupies" the territories because "that term
applies to controlling territory that was captured from another
country in a war of aggression." 298 Arguably, prior to Israeli
occupation, the West Bank was not legally part of any country, but
299
consisted of unallocated portions of the British Mandate.
289. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 260-261.
290. Coalition for an International Criminal Court, InternationalCommittee of the Red
Cross Working Paper-Art. 8(2)(b) ICC Statute, June 18, 1999 (visited Nov. 7, 1999)
<www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8_2b19990618.html> [hereinafter ICRC Working Paper].
291. Rome Treaty art. 8 (2)(b)(viii), supra note 5, at 1007.
292. ICRC Working Paper,supra note 290.
293. See generally Goebel, supra note 261, at 36-37 (discussing claims that civilian
settlements are for purposes of National Security). See also STONE, supra note 227, at 179
("[S]ettlements are merely directed to the requirements of military security in the
occupied territory they do not violate either the spirit or the letter of... Article 49.").
294. But See Goebel, supra note 261, at 36 (stating "that most settlements, if not
forced, are facilitated by government actions.").
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200.
298. Another U.N. Obscenity, supra note 213.
299. See generally Dayanim, supra note 113, at 135-137.
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Therefore, Israel did not capture the West Bank from another
country in a war of aggression, but rather, captured it from another
300
occupying power in the 1967 defensive war.
Another factor to consider in determining whether the ICC
Statute is consistent with preexisting international law is its
treatment of population transfer, which Article 8(2)(b)(viii)
categorizes as a "war crime."
In general, a violation of
international law does not necessarily constitute a war crime or a
crime against humanity. 30 1 By expanding the definition of
"transfer of population," and applying the term "war crime" to
Israel's settlement activity, the ICC Statute dilutes the gravity of a
war crime offense. Although the U.N. declared that Israeli
settlements violated international law, 302 "[t]he great majority of
the numerous resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and the
Security Council on the Israeli occupation have not stated that it is
illegal per se." 303 Furthermore, Israel's activity under no
circumstances can be compared to the mass deportations Nazi
Germany committed during World War II or the "ethnic
30 4
cleansing" committed in the Former Yugoslavia.
[T]he provision on transferring civilian populations into or out
of occupied territories in the Geneva Convention of 1949 was
adopted in response to what the Nazis had done to civilian
populations under their control-deliberately moving vast
groups of people for the purpose of destroying them. It has
always been interpreted to refer to the involuntary transfer of
populations .. 3U
300. See Another U.N. Obscenity, supra note 213.
301. See Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory, War Crimes in InternationalLaw, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 570, 571 (1997).
302. See Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including Jerusalem,
and the Occupied Syrian Golan, G.A. Res. 51/133, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 85, U.N. Doc.
A/51/592 (1997). But see generally Frum, supra note 94 (discussing the U.N.'s habitual
denouncement of Israel and its policy decisions).
303. Roberts, supra note 181, at 67. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli PracticesAffecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories, G.A. Res. 41/63, 41st Sess., 95th plen. mtg. (1986); Report of the Special
Committee to Investigate Israeli PracticesAffecting the Human Rights of the Population of
the Occupied Territories,G.A. Res. 43/58, 43rd Sess., 71st plen. mtg. (1988).
304. See generally STONE, supra note 227, at 178-180. See also generally Zayas, supra
note 267, at 260-261, 272, 281 (condemning the "massive, gross and systematic human
rights violations occurring in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of which are
committed in connection with the systematic policy of 'ethnic cleansing' and genocidal acts
305. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 261-262.
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By adding the words "directly or indirectly" to the transfer of
population definition, the ICC Statute wrongly places voluntary
movement of civilians on par with the type of forcible transfer of
populations the Nazis employed. 30 6 Therefore, the ICC Statute
elevates what once was arguably only a violation of international
law, to a war crime, which is one of the most serious international
30 7
offenses.
B. InternationalLaw of Belligerent Occupation and the
Declarationof Principles
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, which is
30 8
rooted in both peoples' struggle and right of self-determination,
is neither a conventional international struggle between two
sovereign entities nor a purely domestic matter. Consequently,
"[t]he creation of Israel did not involve the substitution of one
sovereignty for another, instead it was a state emerging from a
mandate." 30 9
Israel's formation fostered the emergence of
sovereignty in a territory where sovereignty had been
suspended. 3 10 It is important to recognize that the circumstances
giving rise to the issue of Israeli settlements differ greatly from
those surrounding the crimes committed in Nazi Germany and the
former Yugoslavia.
The laws of belligerent occupation empower the occupant "to
maintain order and utilize the resources of the country for its own
military needs." 31 1
Normally, under the laws of belligerent
occupation, the occupying power is expected to rely on the organs
3 12
of the subservient government to maintain law and order.
"When these institutions prove inadequate, the belligerent may
replace them with institutions of a military nature." 3 13 Because
Israel did not oust a legitimate sovereign from the area, 314 it is
arguable that the laws of belligerent occupation do not apply to
306. See id. at 262.
307. See generally id. at 261-262.
308. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2).
309. John Quigley, Displaced Palestiniansand a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J.
171, 210 (1998).
310. See id.

311.
312.
313.
314.

HENKIN ETAL., supra note 196, at 1032.
See id.
Id.
See Shah, supra note 98, at 245.
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the Israeli occupation. 315 The international community, however,
applied the customary international law of belligerent occupation
to the territories, 316 and consequently, considers the territories to
317
be under Israeli belligerent occupation.
According to the law of belligerent occupation, 318 Israel
implemented its own military institutions because the subservient
government was not only inadequate, it was nonexistent. 319 The
land did not have an established, cohesive legal structure. 320 The
laws of belligerent occupation continue to apply to the occupied
territory until the occupier leaves, which has not yet occurred 321
in
this case, or until the parties enter into an express agreement.
Israel's implementation of laws in the occupied territories is
therefore consistent with the law of belligerent occupation.
In 1993, at the Oslo discussions, Israel and the PLO entered
into the DOP. 322 This bilateral agreement signaled the end to the
application of the laws of belligerent occupation. 323 Under
international law, such a bilateral treaty has a contractual
character that places a legal obligation on the parties and may
prevail over general law. 324 "The rights and duties of States are
determined .. . by their agreement as expressed in treaties-just as
in the case of individuals their rights are specifically determined by
any contract which is binding upon them." 325 As a result, when a
controversy arises between two states regarding a matter regulated
315.

See id.

316. See generally Hansell, supra note 256, at 777.
317. See Dinstein, supra note 99, at 313.
318. See HENKIN ETAL.,supra note 196, at 1032.
319. See generally Curtis, supra note 166, at 492 (discussing the fact that there was no
single cohesive legal system because the region consisted of an "amalgam of Mandatory
law, Jordanian law, Israeli law, military administrative law, and recently enacted local
ordinances.").
320. See id. See also generally Shoham, supra note 206, at 252. The "laws in force" in
the West Bank were a combination of Jordanian law, British Mandatory legislation,
remnants of the 1922-1947 British rule in Palestine, and Ottoman law surviving from
WWI. See id. In Gaza, Egypt enacted security-related laws and regulations specifically
for the area, and in most other areas, the prevailing legislation remained the British
Mandatory Ordinances and Orders, together with some Ottoman remnants. See id.
321. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A
Frameworkfor Future Settlement, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 542, 550-551 (1993).
322. See DOP, supra note 144.
323. See generally Shoham, supra note 206, at 270-271 (discussing the DOP's
applicability, the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the West Bank, and the resulting transfer
of agreed powers and authorities to the Palestinian Council).
324. See HENKIN ET AL, supra note 196, at 95.
325. Id. at 94-95.
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by a treaty, the parties should invoke and apply the applicable
provision of that treaty. 326
Although the treaty does not
automatically prevail over customary international law, the
parties' intentions are of "paramount importance." 327 The treatymaking process allows states to participate equally in creating law
and influencing its progressive development to make it more
responsive to the states' needs and ideals. 328 Newly independent
states would otherwise be subject to a body of customary
international law they played no part in creating.
The DOP is a bilateral treaty that binds both Israel and the
PLO.3 29 Questions arose regarding the DOP's characterization,
because it is an agreement between a state (Israel) and a non-state
organization (the PLO), which was granted U.N. observer
status. 330 Consistent with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Laws of Treaties, the DOP is a bilateral treaty because it is a valid
international agreement between a state and another subject of
international law (such as international organizations). 331 The
DOP provided Israel, a relatively young country, and the PLO, a
self-governing authority without a sovereign state, an opportunity
to develop law based on principles of equity. The DOP is more
responsive and tailored to the parties' specific concerns than many
existing international laws, in which neither had the opportunity to
actively participate in developing.
Article V(3) of the DOP provides that the issue of
settlements, among other things, is to be left for permanent status
negotiations, which are part of the fourth and final stage of
implementation. 332 In the interim, while permanent status
negotiations are pending, Article XXXI(7) of the Interim
Agreement 333 provides that "[n]either side shall initiate or take
any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza
326. See id. at 95.
327.

Id.

328. See id. at 97.
329. See DOP, supra note 144, at 1527.
330. See G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3237 (1974).

331. See generally Vienna Convention art. 5, supra note 27 ("The present Convention
applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization
and to any treaty adopted within an international organization ... ").
332.

See Joel Singer, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Phase Two, JUSTICE, Dec. 1995,

at 1-2.
333. Interim Agreement preamble, supra note 144, at 558.
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Strip . . . . 334 "The Declaration does not define the area of the
settlements, which are to stay under Israeli control, and thus there
is doubt as to how their boundaries are to be defined. 335 During
the interim, Israel will re-deploy its military forces in several stages
and transfer control to the 'Palestinian Authority.336 Once Israel
withdraws from the territories, the Palestinian Authority will take
337
control over all areas, except for the Israeli settlements.
"Changing the status" 338 of the territory is subject to various
interpretations and raises many questions. Neither the DOP nor
the Interim Agreement prohibit or restrict the establishment or
expansion of Israeli settlements. 339 The prohibition on changing
the status of the areas is intended to ensure that neither side takes
unilateral measures, such as annexation or declaration of
statehood. 340
Additionally, because of the assumption that
building will continue throughout the interim period, the Interim
341
Agreement's provisions do not address planning and zoning.
Although establishing settlements may be viewed as a precursor to
annexation, Israel neither intends to annex the West Bank or
Gaza 342 nor has it requisitioned private land for purposes of
establishing settlements. 343 The settlements are only established
on public land after an investigation confirms that no private rights
344
thereto exist.
Arguably, the fact that the DOP postpones addressing the
settlement issue until the final status negotiations 345 demonstrates
334. Id. art. XXXI(7), at 567-568 (emphasis added).
335.

Benvenisti, supra note 321, at 547.

336. See Interim Agreement art. I, supra note 144, at 559. "Re-deployment" refers to
the withdrawal of the Israeli military from the areas designated within the agreement. See
id.

337. See Benvenisti, supra note 321, at 548.
338. Interim Agreement art. XXXI(7), supra note 144, at 568.
339. See Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200.
340. See Singer, supra note 332, at 3.

341.
342.
shortly
city of

See generally Interim Agreement art. XII(1), supra note 144, at 562.
See TESSLER, supra note 104, at 466. East Jerusalem, however, was annexed
after the 1967 Six-Day War; in 1980, the Israeli Government designated the united
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. See Shmuel Berkovitz, The Holy Places in

Jerusalem:Legal Aspects, JUSTICE, Sept. 1996, at 4, 5.

343. See Israel Foreign Ministry, supra note 200.
344. See id. "The process of investigation includes an appeals process, through which
any individual claiming rights in the land can object. Decisions of the Appeals Board and
any declaration that land is state-owned can also be appealed to the High Court of
Justice." Id.

345. See DOP art. 5, supra note 144, at 1528-1529.
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the lack of urgency or grave threat to the Palestinian people's
existence. Were the Israeli settlements on par with the gross mass
deportations committed by Nazi Germany and in the Former
Yugoslavia, the issue would have been far too serious to be left to
negotiate years after the DOP's implementation.
Efforts to advance the peace process continue. On October
23, 1998, the Wye Agreement 346 called for Israel to withdraw from
an additional thirteen percent of the West Bank, in three stages, in
return for specific Palestinian security steps. 347 On November 19,
1998, the Israeli Cabinet approved the Israeli military's
withdrawal. 348 In October 1999, the Israeli Government agreed to
uproot several of the West Bank settlements. 349 Despite the
obstacles the parties encounter, ongoing discussions and efforts to
carry out the DOP continue. 350 Evidently, both parties still
consider themselves bound by the bilateral treaty. Considering
' 351
that the parties' intentions are of "paramount importance,"
other international legal instruments cannot undermine their
commitment to achieve peace on mutually beneficial terms.
Israelis and Palestinians realize the necessity of achieving
peace and opt to achieve that goal via bilateral negotiations. The
Israel-PLO agreements outlined above do not restrict the building
of settlements. 352 They do, however, reflect the parties' intentions
to delay negotiating the future of the settlements until the final
status negotiations. 353 As a result, the ICC Statute attempts to

346. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Wye River Memorandum (Interim
Agreement), Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-PLO, 37 I.L.M. 1251 (1998).
347. See id. §§ 1, II. See also Jim Lobe, Wye Accord Only Another Step, INTER PRESS

SERV. (New York, N.Y.), Oct. 23, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 19901150.
348. See Background: Chronology of Palestinian Autonomy Process, DEUTSCHE

PRESSE-AGENTURE (Hamburg), Sept. 4, 1999, available in Westlaw, All News Plus Wires
Database.
349. See Tracy Wilkinson, Young Israeli Protesters Block Removal of Settlement

Outpost, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999, at A8. See also Rebecca Trounson, Bombs Injure 30
Israelis Ahead of Peace Talks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at A12.
350. See, e.g., Edwin Chen & Tracy Wilkinson, Leaders Join Clinton in Tribute to Slain
Israeli Premier. President Calls on Both Sides to 'Finish the Job' Started by Rabin, L.A.

TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at Al (discussing the continued efforts and negotiations between
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palenstian Authority President Yasser Arafat to
reach a framework agreement to resolve outstanding issues and ultimately obtain peace).
351. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 196, at 95.
352. See generally, DOP art. V, § 3, supra note 144, at 1529; Interim Agreement arts.
XII, XXXI, supra note 144, at 562,568.
353. See DOP art. V, supra note 144, at 1529.
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deprive these parties of their right, as nation-states, to foster
international relations free from outside interference.
VI. POLITICS IN THE ICC AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As a judicial body, the ICC's role is to apply and interpret
international law. The ICC should be an independent, fair,
impartial, and broadly representative international criminal
judiciary free from political influences.
To achieve this
objective, 35 4 the ICC Statute's application and interpretation
"must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights,
and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as
gender, age, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or
3 55
other status."
Since its creation, however, power politics have played a part
in the ICC's development. Arab countries and their supporters
used the ICC as a political tool to condemn Israel. 35 6 Israel and
the United States protested the provision expanding the transfer of
population definition. 3 57 The ICC Statute was deliberately and
openly drafted "in order to meet a political agenda of certain
states, with little affinity to what genuinely constitutes the gravest
of war crimes." 3 58 If the ICC becomes a politically driven judicial
body, its role, as an independent and impartial court, will be
severely undermined. States with less political clout are more
susceptible to exaggerated violations and thus become political
targets. 359 Although the ICC is obligated to apply human rights
norms impartially, such an unbiased application is unlikely with
regard to politically weaker states. 3 60 Moreover, despite this
judicial body's purported "neutrality" and its prohibited use of
354. See Rome Treaty preamble, supra note 5, at 1002 (discussing the reason for the
ICC's formation and purpose, which is to prosecute the most serious crimes threatening
the international community's peace, security, and well being).
355. U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42.
356. See PalestinianLeaders, supra note 13.
357. See generally Scheffer, supra note 40. See also Frum, supra note 94.
358. Statement by Alan Baker, supra note 9.
359. See generally Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 257 ("[A] small group of
countries, meeting behind closed doors in the final days of the Rome conference,
produced a seriously flawed take-it-or-leave-it text, one that provides a recipe for
politicization of the Court and risks deterring responsible international action to promote
peace and security.").
360. See generally id. See also Statement by Alan Baker, supranote 9.
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arbitrary or adverse distinctions, 361 it is highly improbable that the
ICC will completely divorce politics from the international arena.
In this author's view, Israel has been targeted politically, and
in light of transfer of population precedent, its alleged
have been exaggerated. 362
international law violations
Additionally, ICC judges will be selected using the U.N. standard
of "equitable
geographic
representation." 363
Previous
international judicial elections illustrate that this system leaves
364
little hope for the successful election of an Israeli candidate.
In matters concerning Israel, "the United Nations has been
more a political battlefield than a court of justice or a reasonable
legislative assembly." 365 For example, the General Assembly's
attitude towards Israel has often been strident and denunciatorymost notably in General Assembly Resolution 197,366 which
' 367
equated Zionism with "racism and racial discrimination."
Curiously, the U.N. has never officially condemned Arab
aggression against Israel or terrorist actions by the PLO and other
Arab groups. 368 These examples and the ICC Statute's recent
drafting evince that Israel continues to be subject to politicized,
selective targeting and politically motivated charges.
VII. CONCLUSION

The international community has witnessed grave atrocities
throughout history. While the ICC admirably attempts to provide
the international community with tools to prosecute those who
commit heinous crimes, it tumultuously reaches far beyond
361. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42. Adverse distinctions include,
gender, age, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status. See id.
362. See generally Roberts, supra note 181, at 75 (discussing the U.N.'s preoccupation
with the occupied territories and the phraseology employed in some General Assembly
resolutions suggesting that in occupations, as in war, the laws of war are easily used as
political propaganda).
363. Rome Treaty art. 36 (8)(a)(ii), supra note 5, at 1022.
364. See Statement by Alan Baker, supra note 9 (referring to the fact that Israel is
excluded from the U.N. regional grouping system and is therefore precluded from
participating in the U.N.'s main organs, including the Security Council). See also General
Assembly Concludes Considerationof Security Council Reform, supra note 66.
365. Curtis, supra note 166, at 462.
366. See Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 3379, U.N.
GAOR, 13th Sess., Agenda Item 68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3379 (XXX) (1975).
367. Roberts, supra note 181, at 75.
368. See Curtis, supra note 166, at 464.
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recognized boundaries of international law. "What started out as a
treaty to establish an international court has transformed into a
treaty defining crimes and establishing a super-legislature with
power to define additional crimes in the future, and which can be
changed,... by amendment by a two thirds majority .... ,"369
The ICC has become an entity that defines crimes and creates
unnecessary complexities. 370 By expanding the definition of "war
crimes," the ICC Statute fails to reflect customary international
human rights law and thus the ICC thereby exceeds its subject
matter jurisdiction. "The Statute should not have added new
crimes; it should have incorporated existing crimes by reference to
treaties defining those crimes." 371 Had the Statute "established a
court to deal with crimes over which there exists consensus and
then, as consensus developed for new crimes, added them to the
court's jurisdiction, the court would have had a much better
chance of being widely accepted and of succeeding." 372 The ICC's
body of law will eventually expand, but rather than on the terms of
a few states or an individual prosecutor, such expansion should be
through the natural evolution of an impartial judicial body
working for all.
Use of transfer of population in the past has resulted in
unimaginable atrocities; 373 categorizing Israeli settlements as war
crimes, however, is entirely inappropriate because they fall well
short of "grave crimes which deeply shock the conscience of
humanity." 374 Labeling Israeli settlement activity as a war crime
does nothing more than illustrate the effects of extreme political
influence on the Court and further demonstrate this purported
"impartial" international judiciary's potential to abuse its power
and use it as a political tool.
The ICC Statute's indiscriminate jurisdictional scope further
illustrates how the Statute rebukes longstanding principles of
369. Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 235.
370. See id. at 235, 256.
371. Id. at 256.
372. Id. at 235.
373. The transfer of population in the former Yugoslavia amounted to ethnic
cleansing. See generally Zayas, supra note 267, at 259-261, 271-272.
374. Rome Treaty preamble, supra note 5, at 1002. The preamble to the Rome Treaty
provides that the Court was established to address the "unimaginable atrocities which
deeply shock the conscience of humanity" and "the most serious crimes of international
concern." Id. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 234.
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international law. 37 5 International law does not automatically
govern all states; rather, it must evolve over time. 37 6 Subjecting
non-parties to the Statute undermines the international law
principles of sovereignty and the "persistent dissenter. '3 77 The
ICC infringes on states' rights to negotiate bilaterally and
discourages parties from negotiating tailored agreements because
the ICC can undermine such agreements by prosecuting states for
exaggerated violations of the Statute.
After examining the ICC's jurisdiction, the history of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, preexisting international law, and the
erroneous application of the "war crime" provision to Israeli
settlements, it is evident that the ICC Statute needs extensive
improvement. The need for a universal body of law protecting
human rights and an international court enforcing the law is
undeniable. Such an endeavor, however, requires a judicial body
that is truly independent of political influence and does not
overstep customary boundaries of international law-the ICC, as
presently composed, is woefully ill equipped to achieve this
essential and compelling goal.
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